Clive Bell coined the phrase significant form . The way he initially defined the phrase and the way he implemented it were two different matters. In this article Bell's procedure is analysed as a characteristic o f late moder nist aesthetics, i.e. an attempt to come to terms with the challenge o f the radically new in art. It is suggested that one should bear in mind that formalism in this sense is a theory o f artistic material which explains how meaning is communicated and perceived through non-discursive qualities o f the artistic material. That is the relevance o f Susanne K. Longer's reinterpretation o f Bell's phrase.
Introduction
Clive Bell's aesthetics does not make for profound reading. Why bother then? The least one can say is that Bell contributed tow ards the m odem aesthetic vocabulary by coining a phrase that has since become a cliché or hackneyed for that matter, viz. significant form . On the other hand, if one reflects from a distance on the W irkungsgeschichte o f Bell's phrase as well as on the Wirkungsgeschichte o f the problem he w anted to solve, significant form has an intriguing logic. Significant form as an aesthetic category has spawned quite a generation o f related concepts, from Clive Bell to Susanne K. Langer's unconsum m ated sym bol, up to Nelson G oodm an's languages o f art (Goodm an, 1976) , Peter A revised version of a paper read at a 2nd International Symposium on Formalism, organized by the Slovenian Society of Aesthetics in Ljubljana, 14-17 May 1992. I thank Paul Crowther, Ales Erjavec and Richard Woodficld for critical comments on the original version Koers 58 (2) 1993:127-139 K ivy's physiognomy o f musical expression (Kivy, 1980) and perhaps Arthur C. D anto's transfiguration o f the com m onplace (Danto, 1981) , as well as David Summers' conceptual image (Bryson et al., 1991:231-259) .
It has distant relationships with Alois Riegl's Kunstwollen and Julius von Schlosser's Kunstsprache. As such one is justified to say that significant fo rm constitutes one episode in the narrative o f the history o f art as an autonomous and intellectual discipline, i.e. to explain the development o f art forms and styles not with refe rence to the biographies o f artists, but in terms o f concepts related to the arts themselves. A further merit o f the notion o f significant fo rm is that it creates an apparatus for analysing and explaining the reception o f w orks o f art, especially when new works o f art tend to upset well-established patterns o f aesthetic behaviour.
Perhaps that is crediting Bell for too much, for he did not talk o f 'reception o f w orks o f art' but o f 'appreciating art'. Neither did he refer to 'upsetting well established patterns o f aesthetic behaviour', but rather to something akin to unre cognized reappearances o f past great moments o f the history o f art. But that is the sense I propose to make o f his 1914 book, simply titled Art, otherwise described by him self in a 1949 foreword as full o f "exaggerations, childish simplifications and injustices" (1987:xv) . M y approach entails that I shall do some close reading o f Bell's A rt, but with the wisdom o f historical hindsight. I am very much interested in the loose strands o f his argument, as I propose to read them as indications o f unsolved modernist issues. W ithout attem pting a problemgeschichtliche genealogy o f the notion o f significant fo rm , 1 w ant to argue that Susanne K. Langer's interpretation and reworking o f Bell's phrase contributes significantly to formalism as a tenable aesthetic theory. (B ell, 1987:7-8) .
B ell's significant form
In an apparently inductive approach Bell comes to the conclusion that w hat really matters in at least the visual arts are the combination and relation o f formal elements in such a way that they affect the observer in a specific -aestheticway. If w e attend closely to the matter o f formal elements, and read it as Bell's answer to a lamentable cultural situation, his apparently inductive reasoning sounds convincing. W hat Bell is reacting against, as is well known, is the w ay in which art, especially paintings and sculpture, has become consumed in his time. There was "an excessive concern with subject matter" (Dickie, 1955:143) : fashionable paintings and sculpture in England at the turn o f the century were always 'about' something, and the skills o f the artist and his use o f materials w ere secondary to the portrayal o f a subject, to a certain extent taken for granted. One can speak o f the demands o f an art market which set an index for w orks o f art as commodity articles which favoured themes, topics and subjects. O ne can list the art o f W.P. Frith , Sir L. Alma-Tadema (1836 -1912 and Sir L. Filde , all referred to by Bell and classified (and disqualified) as 'D escrip tive Painting' (Bell, 1987:16) , as paradigm cases in this regard. To put it in more recent terminology: somehow a work o f visual art refers back to itself -the 'artiness' o f a work o f art fascinates us, and not so much its subject. If w e have to choose between C ézanne's rendition o f apples and that o f the art school's novice, w e -according to Bell -will always choose C ézanne, because C ézanne's painting is more significant than that o f the art school's novice. With that Bell underscores the aesthetically significant.
Koers 58 (2) 1993:127-139 The significance and insignificance o f d iv e Bell's formalism That seems to make sense. We should, however, bear in mind the shift in focus underlying this argument. W hat Bell says about art, is one thing; what he does about it, another. With 'significant form ' Bell does not merely define the essence of art, but also implies a distinction between 'significant a rt' and 'insignificant art' -a distinction which is argued at great length. Bell is not really speaking o f 'all art' as his argument apparently states. A closer inspection o f his store room for w orks o f art bears this out: the inclusion o f crafts ("a Persian bowl, Chinese carpets") in the class o f 'high' w orks o f art such as the "m asterpieces o f Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cézanne", as well as the cross-cultural collection o f artistic objects appears to be very ecumenical, but is in fact a careful selection to witness to the 'fact' o f 'significant form '. W hat Bell omits is very telling. The art o f the Renaissance and its aftermath during the seventeenth, eighteenth and early ninenteenth century are specifically excluded from the lineage from Byzan tine art to Cézanne. According to Bell "all that did happen [during this period from the fifteenth to the early nineteenth century] w as nothing more than a change from late manhood to early senility complicated by a house-moving; bringing with it new hobbies and occupations. ... A Renaissance picture w as meant to say ju st those things that a patron would like to hear. That w ay lies the end o f art ..." (Bell, 1987:162-163) . About Rembrandt Bell is willing to concede that he may "perhaps [be] the greatest genius o f them all", but then one also has to take into account that "genius-worship is the infallible sign o f an uncreative age" (ibid.: 161), and therefore Rembrandt "is a typical ruin o f his age. For, except in a few o f his later works, his sense o f form and design is utterly lost in a mess o f rhetoric, romance, and chiaroscuro" (ibid..172).
W hat does Bell's lineage o f significant art seem to say? To his contemporaries
Bell's juxtaposition o f Cézanne with Piero della Francesca might have sounded odd, if not outrageous. But he is playing an intellectual trick, apparently backed up by art historical knowledge. Bell delivers an eloquent apology o f the new and unthought o f so far by pointing to the so-called fact that the outrageous has its respected but long-forgotten forerunners. Cézanne is portrayed in this defense as picking up the golden thread that has been lost for some time. He reinstates the good tradition -o f 'significant form '. More important, how ever, is that Bell con flates significant form and significant art, the aesthetically significant and the art historically significant.
Are we any closer now to the meaning o f 'significant form '? W hen is a form 'significant'? Given Bell's conflation o f the possible meanings o f significant fo rm , the problem is not so much how to recognize form, but how to recognize its significance. And when a significant form has been recognized and identified, what exactly has been recognized and identified?
Two kinds o f significance
The close reading o f Bell so far seems to suggest that 'significant form ' implies two meanings: To reiterate: Bell's concept o f significant form leads us toward an aw areness of the use o f rudimentary artistic material. Koers 58(2) 1993:127-139 
The 'formal' qualities o f a work o f art

Art historical sense
There is a second sense in which 'significant form ' is used, which I shall call the art historical sense. A mere descriptive category is not intended by this second use, but rather a term which signifies approbation: a quite readily observable change or break in style which, according to Bell, is for the better. This break appears to be something radically new, but on second (art historical) thoughts it is a mere "crest o f a new movement destined and doomed inevitably to sink to depths undreamed o f ..." (ibid.: 123). The history o f art is to be thought o f as a succession o f declines; each decline is to be likened to a "slope ... which lies between a great primitive morning, when men create art because they must, and that darkest hour when men confound imitation with art" (ibid.: 122). A quite readily observable break in style, when it may lay claim to 'significance', is when an artist or a movement temporarily reverses the inevitable dow nw ard slope to recapture something o f the 'great beginning'. Thus w hatever 'significant form ' may be, it is informed by what is regarded, especially by Bell, as the "great primitive morning". 'Significant form ' should at least be com patible with a certain body o f art historical knowledge, preferably o f the Romantic kind which Bell espouses.
So the phrase significant form , as Bell em ploys it, is rather ambivalent. That does not necessarily disqualify it, although one must acknow ledge that it is not so simple to use it as a key to all genuine art as Bell alleges. In a way these two ging issue. To repeat the question: The problem is not so much how to recognize form, but how to recognize its significance. Bell's answer to this is most unsatis factory, but, again, very revealing. Bell simply reverts to a long-standing tradition that the perception and recognition o f works o f art call for a special, if not elevated, faculty o f the mind, namely the emotions, more specifically the aesthetic emotion. Actually, Bell settles this issue en passant as a logical prerequisite for his notion o f significant fo rm . I quote at length:
The starting-point for all systems o f aesthetics must be the personal experience o f a peculiar emotion. The objects that provoke this emotion we call works o f art. All sensitive people agree that there is a peculiar emotion provoked by works o f art. ... This emotion is called the aesthetic emotion; and if we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all objects that provoke it, we shall have solved what 1 take to be the central problem o f aesthetics (ibid.:7). The end result o f the "stirring o f the aesthetic emotion" is "aesthetic rapture" (ibid.: 18). W hat happens here is that Bell takes the eighteenth century's 'seventh sense', the organ for artistic taste, for granted (cf. M eager, 1955; Osborne 1955) , and without belabouring the socio-cultural requisites for the proper exercise of that organ (as Hume for instance did), masks the inherent elitism o f the modernist concept o f taste by giving a metaphysical twist to the functioning o f the aesthetic emotion. Taste, as a result o f the aesthetic emotion, is not the exclusive domain derived from "an assembly o f civilized men -men like [Hume] him self' (Gay, 1973:309) . Instead o f an autonomy for the sphere o f com merce with the arts based on social or class distinctions, Bell opts for autonomy as exclusivity on metaphysical grounds (cf. Crowther, 1922; Fishman, 1963) .
The aesthetic mysticism to which Bell's account o f the aesthetic emotion leads is an underpinning o f his modernist and formalist approach to cleanse the commerce with w orks o f art from so-called non-aesthetic interests. But it is also at logger heads with the implied requisites o f the term significant fo rm as he implements it himself. The art historical knowledge which is supposed to back up the recog nition o f (historically) significant fo rm in a work o f art (as aesthetically signifi cant form ) has nothing mysterious or mystical about it. It is communicable, it can be conceptualized and it allows for comparison, which is clearly not the case with 'aesthetic rapture'. Significant fo rm may, however, be reconciled with an irrational aesthetic mysticism if it is taken to be the aw areness by way o f the aesthetic emotion o f the mere formal aspects o f a w ork o f art, in the first sense outlined above (i.e. as aesthetically significant fo rm ). I doubt w hether Bell would stick to such an 'em pty' formalism for very long. Significant fo rm in the sense Bell wants to understand it appeals too strongly to a justifiable know ledge o f the history o f art to be that esoteric and idiosyncratic. Bell may not quite be aw are of the impact o f his own reconstruction o f the history o f art on the initial exposition o f his concept o f significant form . Taken as an apparently inductive conclusion from a set o f aesthetic emotional experiences, it seems to underscore the kind o f formalism Eduard Hanslick espoused: form is in a certain sense its own content, it has no significance beyond itself (cf. Ahlberg, 1992:5-20) .
W hatever the case may be, Bell's significant fo rm is a response to a further issue concerning modernist art, i.e. the problem o f the autonomy o f a work o f art. By opposing representation with significant form, and thereby somewhat overhastily excluding semantic meaning from visual art forms (which then is restored in part by the art historical significance o f forms), the independence o f the w ork o f art from an art market or any immediate social function is, at least temporarily, secured. To bolster this autonomy, it is necessary to em phasize the 'tru e' general quality o f all w orks o f art and present it as a generally accessible characteristic o f art. But behind this procedure another typically modernist strategy is hiding: significant fo rm is only accessible to the art-historically educated who surrep titiously take their aesthetic experience as the standard o f all aesthetic experience.
Langer's reinterpretation of significant form
It is on this point that Susanne K. Langer rehabilitates Bell's concept o f signi fic a n t form . She underpins it with an epistemology which one may regard as a precursor o f postm odernist openness. As she states it herself:
[T]he only stumbling block which has held up the progress o f ... 'significant fo rm ' has been, I think, a lack o f understanding o f the ways in which logical structures may enter into various types o f 'significance' (Langer, 1973:218) .
Taking the lead from Bell and at the same time disclaiming his tendency towards a 'purist' formalism (Langer, 1973:cf. 236-7) , she opens up the theoretical scope o f sig n ifica n c e by suggesting a variety o f types o f significance. At the same time the aesthetic experience is relocated: whereas Bell tried to take the late modem use o f the 'ugly' and the visually disconcerting seriously by focussing on the arthistorical significance o f form in Cézanne's paintings by relating them to early 'primitivist' painting, but settling the embarrassing hybrid o f aesthetic understanding uncomfortably in the traditional domain o f the gratification o f the senses, Langer treats sig n ifica n t fo r m as something which has an inherent logic: the 'logic' o f analogy, encompassing the senses, the intellect and language, by which it acts as a means to conceive o f something. 
The significance of form (2)
Let us first consider Langer's argument for the significance o f form in music. Relying on the findings o f a psychological study o f the "many aspects that enter into the notion o f musical significance ... in ways that fairly well exclude non musical factors such as personal associations with tunes, instruments, styles ..., or programmatic suggestions" (ibid.:229), the significance o f (a) musical sound is portrayed as follows: "the lowest stage o f tone-apprehension yields merely an impression o f to n e -co lo r o f the whole tonal complex, or o f a difference between tone-colors o f the separate tones" (ibid.:229), together with a sense o f the duration o f intervals between tones experientially "translated" as "width o f tonal intervals". This lays the foundation for a succession o f meaning constitutive perceptions by the listener. As soon as the listener perceives a difference in tonal colours, an aw areness o f "tonal movement" and consequently o f "musical direc tion" follows. The joint aw areness o f tonal distance and direction leads to the Koers 58 (2) 1993:127-139 Ihe significance and insignificance o f Clive Bell' s formalism perception o f a "musical step", which is the prerequisite for an anticipation o f the following step, or an imagining o f the previous step. This manifests itself in a sense for "consonance, dissonance and relatedness", i.e. a scale or tonic, which in turn "determines the feeling o f modality". Langer concludes:
The entire study shows effectively how many factors o f possible expressive virtue are involved in even the simplest musical structure, how many things beside the acknowledged materials o f composition have crucial functions in conveying a musical message (ibid.:231).
The exact point o f Langer's analysis is to demonstrate how the perception o f certain inherent qualities or characteristics o f the musical material is and becomes related to analogous perceptions gained from other spheres o f experience, and how meaning or sense is imputed in a sublingual fashion from one known per ception to another, to make sense out o f the other.
Music articulates forms which language cannot set forth. ... It is just because music has noI the same terminology and pattern, that it lends itself to the revelation o f non-scientific concepts (ibid.:233).
Given this distinction and limitation, it then makes sense to speak o f "music as a semantic o f vital and emotional facts" (ibid.:235), "for what music can actually reflect is only the morphology o f feeling" (ibid.:238).
"An unconsummated symbol"
This certainly is a big lump to swallow -especially when Langer refers explicitly to Bell: Therefore music is "Significant fo r m ', in the peculiar sense o f 'significant' which Mr. Bell and Mr. Fry maintain they can grasp, or feel, but not define; such significance is implicit, but not conventionally fixed (ibid .:2 4 1).
Perhaps Langer allows herself too much liberty in defining significance if one concedes readily the gap which at least Bell has left her. But I would not object too much at such a 'creative misunderstanding'. Implicit in B ell's use o f the term significant fo rm and in Langer's exposition o f it is the notion o f 'reading' a painting or a composition/performance. If Bell's concept o f significant fo rm does not include an allusion to semantics, it can be maintained that the implicit notion o f reading is contained in his version o f significant fo rm by the activity o f art historical comparison which supports it. Something similar goes for Langer: it is the sublingual, subconscious activity o f com paring and relating the different aspects o f sound which gives rise to it attaining some sense. Langer is careful to distinguish artistic meaning from the kind o f meaning Bell disqualified as 'descriptive'. Artistic meaning is symbolic meaning which does not invite us to to deal with something by evoking an emotional response. Symbolic meaning leads us to "insight", to "conceive" o f something (ibid.:223). This is best under stood when the traditional logical distinction between denotation and connotation is also taken into account. A musical form does not denote a specific mood in the sense that it is a necessary expression o f the mood o f the com poser at the time o f the composition, or a mood o f that kind expressed through music and in some w ay recognizable by an audience. Langer maintains that music has all the earmarks o f a true symbolism, except one: the existence o f an assigned connotation. It is a form that is capable o f connotation, and the meanings to which it is amenable are articulations o f emotive, vital, sentient experiences. But its import is never fixed. [F] or music at its highest, though dearly a symbolic form, is an unconsummated symbol.
A rticulation is its life, but not assertion; expressiveness, not expression. The actual function o f meaning, which calls for permanent contents, is not fulfilled; for the assignment o f one rather than another possible meaning to each form is never explicitly made (ibid.:240).
In order to get the gist o f Langer's attempt at rehabilitating B ell's concept o f sig nificant fo rm , one should bear in mind the modernist genealogy o f the concept of art. If one takes Kant as one o f the major contributors to this concept, one thing that one should never ignore is K ant's insistence on art as a form o f knowledge or cognition. From a postmodern standpoint one could read K ant's notion o f the aesthetic idea ( 'that representation o f the imagination which induces much thought, yet without the possibility o f any definite thought whatever, ... and which language, consequently, can never get quite on level terms with or render com pletely intelligible' [Kant, 1968:417 -my The meaning o f those first two lines is not contained in the exact denotations o f the words, but in the unusual placement and inversion o f abseits. The conven tional usage would have been: Und die Stadt liegt abseits. Bringing abseits to a more accentuated position in the line and changing it to seitab is to allude sublin gually to a sense o f displacedness and abandonment.
C onclusion
If one can 'formalize' this explanation, it can be said that formalism as an artistic and an aesthetic practice is the conveying and conceiving o f meaning through non-discursive means. The major hinge o f formalism in this sense is the identifi cation o f contrasts and tensions and their resolutions through the exploitation o f a constellation o f artistically activated qualities o f what is traditionally understood as the artist's medium, viz. pigments (painting), voluminous m atter (sculpture), words (literature), sound (music), movement (dance). But formalism can go one step further: what has traditionally been taken as the form o f a w ork o f art, e.g. the 'sonnet form', the 'sonata form ', still life or landscape painting or portraiture, etc., also becomes 'form alized' or conventionalized. Its features are generalized, and, once established through discursive formulation, rew orked in artistic practice as a frame o f reference, or a number o f 'clues' 'which induces much thought' exactly in the sense o f the Kantian aesthetic idea, or a horizon o f expectations for its deciphering. W hen the consciousness o f form has achieved this stage, it changes its function from 'recipe' to critical instrument for artist and critic, and thereby it paves the w ay for its own dissolution. This does not mean the end o f art, but, at least for the time being, the recycling o f forms in all its dimensions.
